Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cripps, MW; Dekel, E; Pesendorfer, W
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; Washington University (WUSTL); Tel Aviv University; Princeton University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.04.009
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 259-272
• 关键词: Reputation; repeated games

摘要

We analyze reputation effects in two-player repeated games of strictly conflicting interests. In such games, player 1 has a commitment action such that a best reply to it gives player 1 the highest individually rational payoff and player 2 the minmax payoff. Players have equal discount factors. With positive probability player 1 is a type who chooses the commitment action after every history. We show that player 1's payoff converges to the maximally feasible payoff when the discount factor converges to one. This contrasts with failures of reputation effects for equal discount factors that have been demonstrated in the literature. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.