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作者：Diamantoudi, Effrosyni; Xue, Licun
作者单位：Concordia University - Canada; McGill University
摘要：If agents negotiate openly and form coalitions, can they reach efficient agreements? We address this issue within a class of coalition formation games with externalities where agents' preferences depend solely on the coalition structure they are associated with. We derive Ray and Vohra's [Equilibrium binding agreements, J. Econ. Theory 73 (1997) 30-78] notion of equilibrium binding agreements using von Neumann and Morgenstern [Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton University Press, ...
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作者：Perea, Andres
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：We present a theory of rationality in dynamic games in which players, during the course of the game, may revise their beliefs about the opponents' utility functions. The theory is based upon the following three principles: (1) the players' initial beliefs about the opponents' utilities should agree on some profile u of utility functions, (2) every player should believe, at each of his information sets, that his opponents are carrying out optimal strategies and (3) a player at information set I...
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作者：Ju, Biung-Ghi; Miyagawa, Eiichi; Sakai, Toyotaka
作者单位：University of Kansas; Columbia University; Yokohama City University
摘要：When resources are divided among agents, the characteristics of the agents are taken into consideration. A simple example is the bankruptcy problem, where the liquidation value of a bankrupt firm is divided among the creditors based on their claims. We characterize division rules under which no group of agents can increase the total amount they receive by transferring their characteristics within the group. By allowing agents' characteristics to be multi-dimensional and choosing the meaning of...
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作者：Pandher, Gurupdesh
作者单位：DePaul University
摘要：Arbitrage-free models for valuing interest rate securities posit that stochastic changes in spot or forward interest rates (forward rate speed) follow a diffusion process. This paper extends the Heath, Jarrow and Morton (Bond pricing and the term structure of interest rates: a new methodology for contingent claims valuations, Econometrica 60 (1992) 77-105], HJM framework by allowing diffusive shocks to both the speed and acceleration of forward rates. The arbitrage-free restriction on forward ...
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作者：Saint-Paul, Gilles
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole
摘要：Many workers produce intangible, knowledge-intensive inputs, rather than participating directly in the production process. We develop a model where the labor market organizes itself in a knowledge hierarchy. Skills are segmented into successive clusters. Each cluster buys knowledge from the next one and sells knowledge as a production input to the preceding one. The model is useful to study the impact of improvements in the technology of knowledge transmission on inequality. It is shown that i...
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作者：Ahn, David S.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We present a theory of interactive beliefs analogous to Mertens and Zamir [Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information, Int. J. Game Theory 14 (1985) 1-29] and Brandenburger and Dekel [Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge, J. Econ. Theory 59 (1993) 189-198] that allows for hierarchies of ambiguity. Each agent is allowed a compact set of beliefs at each level, rather than just a single belief as in the standard model. We propose appropriate definitions of coher...
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作者：Miller, Nolan H.; Pratt, John W.; Zeckhauser, Richard J.; Johnson, Scott
作者单位：Harvard University; Harvard University; Australian National University
摘要：We consider the mechanism design problem when agents' types are multi dimensional and continuous, and their valuations are interdependent. If there are at least three agents whose types satisfy a weak correlation condition, then for any decision rule and any epsilon > 0 there exist balanced transfers that render truthful revelation a Bayesian epsilon-equilibrium. A slightly stronger correlation condition ensures that there exist balanced transfers that induce a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in whi...
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作者：Cai, Hongbin; Riley, John; Ye, Lixin
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Peking University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：In a general auction model in which bidders' signals are affiliated, we characterize the unique separating equilibrium in which the seller can use reserve prices to credibly signal her private information. When the buyers' signals are independent, the optimal reserve price is shown to be increasing in the number of bidders under certain conditions. We also demonstrate that the probability that the item is sold at the reserve price can increase as the number of bidders increases, which indicate...
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作者：Rodrigues-Neto, Jose Alvaro
作者单位：Australian National University
摘要：In the context of the stable roommates problem, it is shown that acyclicity of preferences is equivalent to the existence of symmetric utility functions, i.e. the utility of agent i when matched with j is the same as j's utility when matched with i. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Bloch, Francis; Jackson, Matthew O.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of Warwick; Aix-Marseille Universite
摘要：We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network, when players may bargain by promising or demanding transfer payments when forming links. We vary three aspects of the came: (i) whether players can only make transfers to (and receive transfers from) players to whom they are directly linked, or whether they can also subsidize links that they are not directly involved in, (ii) whether or not transfers relating to a given link can be...
