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作者：Scroggin, Steven
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：In repeated fixed-pair constant-sum games with unique equilibria in mixed strategies, such as matching pennies, the subgame perfect equilibrium is repeating the stage-game mixed-strategy equilibrium action. In such games rational players avoid strategies that are exploitable, in that current actions either deviate systematically from the equilibrium action probabilities or fail to be serially independent of past actions. I revisit classic experiments and find that subjects' actions are sometim...
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作者：Luttmer, Erzo G. J.; Mariotti, Thomas
作者单位：Universite PSL; Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We consider an exchange economy with time-inconsistent consumers whose preferences are additively separable. If consumers have identical discount factors, then allocations that are Pareto efficient at the initial date are also renegotiation-proof. In an economy with a sequence of markets, competitive equilibria are Pareto efficient in this sense, and for generic endowments, only if preferences are locally homothetic. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Faig, Miquel; Huangfu, Xiuhua
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：Competitive search was recently introduced in monetary economics by Rocheteau and Wright [Money in search equilibrium, in competitive equilibrium, and in competitive search equilibrium, Econometrica 73 (2005) 175-2031. We extend their work by eliminating the restriction that the fees market makers charge to enter a submarket must be either non-negative or identical for buyers and sellers. Without this restriction, buyers pay a positive fee to enter the submarket they visit and nothing else whe...
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作者：Krasa, Stefan; Williams, Steven R.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：Limited observability is the assumption that economic agents can only observe a finite amount of information. Given this constraint, contracts among agents are necessarily finite and incomplete in comparison to the ideal complete contract that we model as infinite in detail. We consider the extent that finite contracts can approximate a complete contract. The objectives of the paper are: (i) to identify properties of agents' preferences that determine whether or not finiteness of contracts cau...
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作者：Kim, Chongmin; Wong, Kam-Chau
作者单位：Kookmin University; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：We study the non-cooperative formation of a (directed) network that builds upon one-way immediate links. Our novel feature is that we require circular paths of links for productive activities. This captures more clearly the higher level of coordination that is often required for network formations than models such as those of Jackson and Wolinsky [A strategic model of social and economic networks, J. Econ. Theory 71 (1996) 44-74] and Bala and Goyal [A non-cooperative model of network formation...
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作者：Zeira, Joseph
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：The recent widening of wage inequality has been attributed by some to skill-biased-technical-change and by others to trade liberalization. This paper examines the two explanations within a unified model and also presents a new modeling of skill-biased-technical-change, where skilled workers replace unskilled ones. As a result technology adoption is endogenous and does not occur in all countries. Hence, wages for both types of workers, trade patterns and also factor productivities in all countr...
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作者：Azariadis, Costas; Kaas, Leo
作者单位：University of Konstanz; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We analyze the pricing of a productive asset in a class of dynamic exchange economies with heterogeneous, infinitely-lived agents, and self-enforcing intertemporal trades. Individual incomes fluctuate and are correlated; preferences, dividends and aggregate income are fixed. Almost all economies in this class have a unique stationary Markovian equilibrium with fluctuations in asset prices. As the set of unrationed households changes over time and states, excess demand functions shift, asset re...
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作者：Behrens, Kristian; Murata, Yasusada
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; Nihon University
摘要：We analyze a class of 'large group' Chamberlinian monopolistic competition models by applying different concepts of functional separability to the same set of first-order conditions for utility maximization. We show that multiplicatively quasi-separable (MQS) functions yield 'constant relative risk aversion' (CRRA), and, therefore 'constant elasticity of substitution' (CES), functions, whereas additively quasi-separable (AQS) functions yield 'constant absolute risk aversion' (CARA) functions. ...
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作者：Dequiedt, Vianney
作者单位：INRAE; Communaute Universite Grenoble Alpes; Universite Grenoble Alpes (UGA)
摘要：We study collusion in an IPV auction with binary type spaces. Collusion is organized by a third party that can manipulate participation decisions. We characterize the optimal response of the seller to different threats of collusion among the bidders. We show that, contrary to the prevailing view that asymmetric information imposes transaction costs in side contracting, collusion in the optimal auction is efficient when the third party can implement monetary transfers as well as when it can imp...
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作者：McAdams, David
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：The first-price auction has a unique monotone pure strategy equilibrium when there are n symmetric risk-averse bidders having affiliated types and interdependent values. (C) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
