Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Miller, Nolan H.; Pratt, John W.; Zeckhauser, Richard J.; Johnson, Scott
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Harvard University; Australian National University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.09.005
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 476-496
• 关键词: Mechanism design; interdependent valuations; multidimensional types

摘要

We consider the mechanism design problem when agents' types are multi dimensional and continuous, and their valuations are interdependent. If there are at least three agents whose types satisfy a weak correlation condition, then for any decision rule and any epsilon > 0 there exist balanced transfers that render truthful revelation a Bayesian epsilon-equilibrium. A slightly stronger correlation condition ensures that there exist balanced transfers that induce a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which agents' strategies are nearly truthful. (C) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.