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作者：Falkinger, Josef
作者单位：University of Zurich
摘要：A new theoretical model is developed which describes the structure of competition for attention and characterizes equilibria. The exogenous fundamentals of an attention economy are the space of receiving subjects with their attention capacity, and the potential set of competing firms (senders) with their radiation technology. The endogenous variables explained by the theory are equilibrium audiences (the clients belonging to a sender), their signal exposure and attention, and the diversity of ...
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作者：Savaglio, Ernesto; Vannucci, Stefano
作者单位：G d'Annunzio University of Chieti-Pescara; University of Siena
摘要：We compare profiles of opportunity sets by means of set-inclusion filtral preorders (SIFPs). Some significant results of the classic theory of income inequality are reproduced in the SIFP-framework. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Anderson, Siwan
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：An influential explanation for rising dowry payments is the marriage squeeze. The present paper shows this explanation to be internally inconsistent. The marriage squeeze argument for inflation relies on the fact that population growth leads to an excess supply of brides in the marriage market. This excess supply is resolved by some women postponing marriage, so that the average age of brides increases. In previous studies the argument is stated informally. Here, a matching model of marriage i...
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作者：Board, Simon
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：Contracts often take the form of options: oil fields can be abandoned, planning permission may go unused, and acquired firms can be liquidated. We consider a seller who auctions a dynamic option among N agents. After the auction, the economy evolves and the winning bidder chooses both if and when to execute the option. The revenue-maximising auction consists of an up-front bid and a contingent fee, where the latter is chosen in a Pigouvian manner, so the winning agent's choice of exercise time...
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作者：Maus, Stefan; Peters, Hans; Storcken, Ton
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：We compare the manipulability of different choice rules by considering the number of manipulable profiles. We establish the minimal number of such profiles for tops-only, anonymous, and surjective choice rules, and show that this number is attained by unanimity rules with status quo. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Heifetz, Aviad; Shannon, Chris; Spiegel, Yossi
作者单位：Open University Israel; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Tel Aviv University
摘要：The assumption that decision makers choose actions to maximize their preferences is a central tenet in economics, often justified formally or informally by appealing to evolutionary arguments. In contrast, we show that in almost every game and for almost every family of distortions of a player's actual payoffs, some degree of this distortion is beneficial to the player, and will not be driven out by any evolutionary process involving payoff-monotonic selection dynamics. Consequently, under any...
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作者：Hyogo, Kazuya
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：Typically an experiment is defined by a set of possible signals and a likelihood function, and both are specified exogenously-they are taken to be observable by the analyst. This paper renders them subjective by showing that they may be derived from suitable choice behavior. This is done in the context of an axiomatic representation theorem for preference on a suitable domain. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Beggs, A. W.
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：This paper uses the theory of large deviations to analyse equilibrium selection in one-dimensional games with large populations where the system evolves according to a jump, Markov process. The equilibria selected maximise a quasi-potential function which can be determined by solving a polynomial equation. Estimates of waiting times are also given. It shows that the equilibria about which there is more noise are less likely to be selected and clarifies the role of the limiting deterministic dy...
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作者：Ambec, Stefan
作者单位：Communaute Universite Grenoble Alpes; Universite Grenoble Alpes (UGA); INRAE
摘要：This paper examines an informed principal-agent game with ex post participation constraints for the agent. It shows that the players do not lose by communicating in turn among themselves rather than simultaneously if and only if the principal communicates first. It then considers every Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules that assign non-negative payoffs for one player in a bilateral asymmetric information framework. It provides necessary and sufficient conditions for sequential comm...
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作者：Bergantinos, Gustavo; Vidal-Puga, Juan J.
作者单位：Universidade de Vigo
摘要：We study minimum cost spanning tree problems and define a cost sharing rule that satisfies many more properties than other rules in the literature. Furthermore, we provide an axiomatic characterization based on monotonicity properties. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
