-
作者：Gromb, Denis; Martimort, David
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole
摘要：We study the optimal design of incentive contracts for experts in different collusion environments, and explore implications for the organization of delegated expertise. We consider a principal relying on experts to gather and report two signals about a project's value. The principal can have a single expert gather both signals or two experts gather one signal each. We show that absent collusion, the multiexpert organization dominates the single expert organization. However, this ranking is re...
-
作者：Peretto, Pietro F.
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：I take a new look at the long-run implications of taxation through the lens of modem Schumpeterian growth theory. I focus on the latest vintage of models that sterilize the scale effect through a process of product proliferation that fragments the aggregate market into submarkets whose size does not increase with the size of the workforce. I show that the following interventions raise welfare: (a) granting full expensibility of R&D to incorporated firms; (b) eliminating the corporate income ta...
-
作者：Docquier, Frederic; Paddison, Oliver; Pestieau, Pierre
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; University of Liege
摘要：This paper considers a three-overlapping-generations model of endogenous growth wherein human capital is the engine of growth. It first contrasts the laissez-faire and the optimal solutions Three possible accumulation regimes are distinguished. Then it discusses a standard set of tax-transfer instruments that allow for decentralization of the social optimum. Within the limits of our model, the rationale for the standard pattern of intergenerational transfers (the working-aged financing the edu...
-
作者：Polanski, Arnold
作者单位：Queens University Belfast
摘要：Each connected pair of nodes in a network can jointly produce one unit of surplus. A maximum number of linked nodes is selected in every period to bargain bilaterally over the division of the surplus, according to the protocol proposed by Rubinstein and Wollinsky [Equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining, Econometrica 53 (1985) 1133-1150]. All pairs, which reach an agreement, obtain the (discounted) payoffs and are removed from the network. This bargaining game has a unique subgame p...
-
作者：de Palma, Andre; Kilani, Karim
作者单位：heSam Universite; Conservatoire National Arts & Metiers (CNAM); CY Cergy Paris Universite; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech
摘要：The consumer benefit in a discrete choice model is often measured by maximum utility. We characterize the conditional (on the chosen alternative) and the unconditional distribution of maximum utility. We show that among a wide class of distributions (independent with convex supports) of error terms, the Type I extreme-value distribution is the unique distribution which ensures that all the conditional distributions of maximum utility coincide. Moreover, we show that for i.i.d. (with convex sup...
-
作者：Karp, Larry
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：This paper derives the dynamic programming equation (DPE) to a differentiable Markov Perfect equilibrium in a problem with non-constant discounting and general functional forms. Beginning with a discrete stage model and taking the limit as the length of the stage goes to 0 leads to the DPE corresponding to the continuous time problem. The note discusses the multiplicity of equilibria under non-constant discounting, calculates the bounds of the set of candidate steady states, and Pareto ranks t...
-
作者：Cazzavillan, Guido; Pintus, Patrick
作者单位：Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; Aix-Marseille Universite; Aix-Marseille Universite
摘要：Reichlin [Equilibrium cycles in an overlapping generations economy with production, J. Econ. Theory 40 (1986) 89-102] has shown in an OLG model with productive capital that whenever the steady state is locally indeterminate and undergoes a Hopf bifurcation, it is Pareto-optimal. While these results were established under the assumption of Leontief technology, the author has partially extended them to show that the Hopf bifurcation is robust with respect to the introduction of capital-labor sub...
-
作者：Bose, Subir; Zhao, Jinhua
作者单位：Iowa State University; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：We study the mechanism design problem when the principal can condition the agent's transfers on the realization of ex post signals that are correlated with the agent's types. Cremer and McLean [Econometrica 53(1985) 345-361; 56(1988) 1247-1257], McAfee and Reny [Econometrica 60(2)(1992) 395-421], and Riordan and Sappington [J. Econ. Theory, 45(1988) 189-199] studied situations where the signals are such that full surplus can be extracted from every agent type. We study optimal utilization of t...
-
作者：Bossert, Walter; Sprumont, Yves; Suzumura, Kotaro
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University; Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We reconsider the problem of ordering infinite utility streams. As has been established in earlier contributions, if no representability condition is imposed, there exist strongly Paretian and finitely anonymous orderings of intertemporal utility streams. We examine the possibility of adding suitably formulated versions of classical equity conditions. First, we provide a characterization of all ordering extensions of the generalized Lorenz criterion as the only strongly Paretian and finitely a...
-
作者：Esteban, Susanna; Miyagawa, Eiichi; Shum, Matthew
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Columbia University; Johns Hopkins University
摘要：A basic assumption of economics is that consumers choose what they want. However, many consumers find it difficult to stop overeating, overspending, smoking, procrastinating, etc, even though they want to. In reality, consumers have temptation and it is psychologically costly to exercise self-control. To clarify the implications of the existence of temptation and self-control costs, this paper studies a firm's optimal selling strategy exploiting the behavioral features of consumers. We charact...
