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作者：Cardona, Daniel; Ponsati, Clara
作者单位：Universitat de les Illes Balears; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE)
摘要：We analyze bargaining over the one-dimension characteristic of a public good among n impatient players when decisions require q favorable votes, q >= 2. Stationary subgame perfect equilibrium strategies are characterized for all games with deterministic protocol. We provide a monotonicity condition (satisfied by all single-peak, strictly quasi-concave and concave utilities) that assures uniqueness for every q whenever player's utilities are symmetric around the peak. Without symmetry, the mono...
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作者：Ehlers, Lars; Masso, Jordi
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：We study ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibria of stable mechanisms in centralized matching markets under incomplete information. We show that truth-telling is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the revelation game induced by a common belief and a stable mechanism if and only if all the profiles in the support of the common belief have singleton cores. Our result matches the observations of Roth and Peranson [The redesign of the matching market for American physicians: some engineering aspects...
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作者：Nishimura, Kiyohiko G.; Ozaki, Hiroyuki
作者单位：Bank of Japan; Keio University
摘要：When firms make a decision about irreversible investment, they may not have complete confidence about their perceived probability measure describing future uncertainty. They may think other probability measures perturbed from the original one are also possible. Such uncertainty, characterized by not a single probability measure but a set of probability measures, is called Knightian uncertainty. The effect of Knightian uncertainity on the value of irreversible investment opportunity is shown to...
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作者：Polanski, Arnold
作者单位：Queens University Belfast
摘要：We propose a recursive method of pricing an information good in a network of holders and demanders of this good. The prices are determined via a unique equilibrium outcome in a sequence of bilateral bargaining games that are played by connected agents. If the information is a homogenous, non-depreciating pod without network effects, we derive explicit formulae which elucidate the role of the link pattern among the players. Particularly, we find out that the equilibrium price is intimately rela...
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作者：Arlegi, Ricardo
作者单位：Universidad Publica de Navarra
摘要：This work analyzes the problem of individual choice under complete uncertainty. In this context, each alternative action consists of a set of different possible outcomes with no associated probability distribution. The work examines and defines a class of rules such that: (a) the evaluation of sets (actions) follows a certain procedural pattern; and (b) an assumption of sequential contraction consistency, which is an adaptation of Sen's alpha condition, is satisfied. In this framework, some re...
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作者：Nehring, Klaus; Puppe, Clemens
作者单位：Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology; University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：We define a general notion of single-peaked preferences based on abstract betweenness relations. Special cases are the classical example of single-peaked preferences on a line, the separable preferences on the hypercube. the multi-dimensionally single-peaked preferences on the product of lines, but also the unrestricted preference domain. Generalizing and unifying the existing literature, we show that a social choice function is strategy-proof on a sufficiently rich domain of generalized singl...
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作者：Ehlers, Lars
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：The following properties of the core of a one-to-one matching problem are well-known: (i) the core is non-empty; (ii) the core is a distributive lattice; and (iii) the set of unmatched agents is the same for any two matchings belonging to the core. The literature on two-sided matching focuses almost exclusively on the core and studies extensively its properties. Our main result is the following characterization of (Von Neumann-Morgenstern) stable sets in one-to-one matching problems. We show t...
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作者：Muendler, Marc-Andreas
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：A rational expectations equilibrium with positive demand for financial information does exist under fully revealing asset price-contrary to a wide-held conjecture. Whereas a continuum of investors is inconsistent with fully revealing equilibrium, finitely many investors with average portfolios demand information in equilibrium if they can adjust portfolio size in an additive signal-return model. More information diminishes the expected excess return of a risky asset so that investors who only ...
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作者：Goyal, Sanjeev; Vega-Redondo, Fernando
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; University of Essex; Universitat d'Alacant
摘要：We consider a setting where every pair of players that undertake a transaction (e.g. exchange goods or information) creates a unit surplus. A transaction can take place only if the players involved have a connection. If the connection is direct the two players split the surplus equally, while if it is indirect then intermediate players also get an equal share of the surplus. Thus, individuals form links with others to create surplus, to gain intermediation rents, and to circumvent others who a...
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作者：Jaimovich, Nir
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：This paper analyzes how the interaction between firms' entry-and-exit decisions and variations in competition gives rise to self-fulfilling, expectation-driven fluctuations in aggregate economic activity and in measured total factor productivity (TFP). The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which net business formation is endogenously procyclical and leads to endogenous countercyclical variations in markups. This interaction leads to indeterminacy in which economic flu...
