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作者：McAdams, David
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Except for well-studied special cases in which bidders have single-unit demand or bidders are risk-neutral with independent private values, equilibria of uniform-price auctions with private values need not possess familiar monotonicity properties. In particular, equilibria in weakly undominated strategies may exist in which some bidders bid strictly less on some units when they have strictly higher values for every unit. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Peters, Michael
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：Two sides of a finite marriage market engage in costly investment and are then matched assortatively. The purpose of the investment is solely to improve the quality of the match that the trader can attain in the second stage. The paper studies the limits of equilibrium of these finite matching games as the number of traders gets large. It is shown that mixed Nash equilibria in the finite games converge to degenerate pure strategy equilibria in the limit in which both sides of the market invest...
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作者：Walker, Todd B.
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：Accommodating asymmetric information in a dynamic asset pricing model is technically challenging due to the problems associated with higher-order expectations. That is, rational investors are forced into a situation where they must forecast the forecasts of other agents. In a dynamic setting, this problem telescopes into the infinite future and the dimension of the relevant state space approaches infinity. By using the frequency domain approach of Whiteman [Linear Rational Expectations Models:...
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作者：Li, Duozhe
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：Two impatient players bargain over a pie of size one according to the infinite alternating-offers procedure. Players' payoffs depend not only on the outcome but also on the process of the bargaining. Specifically, they prefer impasse to any agreement that gives them lower discounted utility than would have been derived from accepting earlier offers. We characterize the essentially unique subgame perfect equilibrium path, which consists of gradual concessions. The more patient players are, the ...
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作者：Caruana, Guillermo; Einav, Liran; Quint, Daniel
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper presents a new non-cooperative approach to multilateral bargaining. We consider a demand game with the following additional ingredients: (i) there is an exogenous deadline, by which bargaining has to end; (ii) prior to the deadline, players may sequentially change their demands as often as they like; (iii) changing one's demand is costly, and this cost increases as the deadline gets closer. The game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium prediction in which agreement is reached im...
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作者：Gravel, Nicolas; Thoron, Sylvie
作者单位：Universite de Toulon
摘要：Conditions under which endogenous processes of jurisdiction formation entail wealth-stratification are examined in a model where unequally wealthy households with identical preferences form jurisdictions in order to produce a public good financed by proportional taxation. We define a stable jurisdiction structure to be a partition of the households into jurisdictions that is immune to individual deviations. We define a jurisdiction structure to be wealth-stratified when each jurisdiction is co...
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作者：Papai, Szilvia
作者单位：Concordia University - Canada
摘要：We show how to restrict trades in exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods so that the resulting restricted exchange markets, the fixed deal exchange markets, have a unique core allocation. Our results on fixed deal exchange markets generalize classical results on the Shapley-Scarf housing market, in which each agent owns one good only. Furthermore, we define the class of fixed deal exchange rules for general exchange markets, and prove that these are the only exchange rules that ...
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作者：Levy, Moshe
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：This paper examines the conditions required to guarantee positive prices in the CAPM. Positive prices imply an upper bound on the equity premium. This upper bound depends on the degree of diversity of firms' fundamentals, and it is independent of investors' preferences. In economies with realistically diverse assets the only positive-price CAPM equilibrium theoretically possible is a degenerate one, with zero equity premium. Furthermore, when specific standard investors' preferences are assume...
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作者：Beaudry, Paul; Portier, Franck
作者单位：Institut Universitaire de France; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; University of British Columbia; University of British Columbia
摘要：It is often argued that changes in expectation are an important driving force of the business cycle. However, it is well known that changes in expectations cannot generate positive co-movement between consumption, investment and employment in the most standard neo-classical business cycle models. This gives rise to the question of whether changes in expectation can cause business cycle fluctuations in any neo-classical setting or whether such a phenomenon is inherently related to market imperf...
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作者：Fleurbaey, Marc
作者单位：Universite Paris Cite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：This paper studies the ethical underpinnings of two social criteria which are prominent in the literature dealing with the problem of evaluating allocations of several consumption goods in a population with heterogenous preferences. The Pazner-Schmeidler criterion [Pazner-Schmeidler, Egalitarian equivalent allocations: a new concept of economic equity, Quart. J. Econ. 92 (1978) 671-687] and the Egalitarian Walras criterion [Fleurbaey and Maniquet, Utilitarianism versus fairness in welfare econ...
