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作者：Haag, Matthew; Lagunoff, Roger
作者单位：Georgetown University; University of Warwick
摘要：When time preferences are heterogeneous and bounded away from one, how much cooperation can be achieved by an ongoing group? How does group cooperation vary with the group's size and structure? This paper examines characteristics of cooperative behavior in the class of symmetric, repeated games of collective action. These are games characterized by free rider problems in the level of cooperation achieved. The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games is a special case. We characterize the level of max...
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作者：Salant, Yuval
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We establish how large a sample of past decisions is required to predict future decisions of a committee with few members. The committee uses majority rule to choose between pairs of alternatives. Each member's vote is derived from a linear ordering over all the alternatives. We prove that there are cases in which an observer cannot predict precisely any decision of a committee based on its past decisions. Nonetheless, approximate prediction is possible after observing relatively few random pa...
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作者：Amarante, Massimiliano; Filiz, Emel
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：We study the properties associated to various definitions of ambiguity [L.G. Epstein, J. Zhang, Subjective probabilities on subjectively unambiguous events, Econometrica 69 (2001) 265-306; P. Ghirardato et al., Differentiating ambiguity and ambiguity attitude, J. Econ. Theory H 8 (2004) 133-173; K. Nehring, Capacities and probabilistic beliefs: a precarious coexistence, Math. Soc. Sci. 38 (1999) 197-213; J. Zhang, Subjective, ambiguity, expected utility and Choquet expected utility, Econ. Theo...
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作者：Sotomayor, Marilda
作者单位：Universidade de Sao Paulo
摘要：Multiple-partners assignment game is the name used by Sotomayor [The multiple partners game, in: M. Majumdar (Ed.), Equilibrium and Dynamics: Essays in Honor of David Gale, The Macmillan Press Ltd., New York, 1992; The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game, Int. J. Game Theory 28 (1999) 567-583] to describe the cooperative structure of the many-to-many matching market with additively separable utilities. Stability concept is proved to be diffe...
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作者：Xu, Yongsheng; Zhou, Lin
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Shanghai Jiao Tong University
摘要：Collective choices are often cyclic and cannot be rationalized by maximization of a single linear ordering. In this paper, we identify conditions under which collective choices, potentially cyclic, can be rationalized by extensive games with perfect information. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Kopylov, Igor
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：The Savagian choice-theoretic construction of subjective probability does not apply to preferences, like those in the Ellsberg Paradox, that reflect a distinction between risk and ambiguity. We formulate two representation results-one for expected utility, the other for probabilistic sophistication-that derive subjective probabilities but only on a small domain of risky events. Risky events can be either specified exogenously or in terms of choice behavior; in the latter case, both the values ...
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作者：Hamilton, Jonathan; Slutsky, Steven
作者单位：State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要：In the standard optimal income taxation problem, tax payments depend only on each consumer's own actions. Piketty [J. Econ. Theory 61 (1993) 23-41] shows that, if one individual's tax schedule depends on others' actions and the government knows the exact ability distribution, it can implement any undistorted allocation as the unique revelation game outcome. If some individuals misreveal their types, Piketty's mechanism may assign infeasible allocations. We require that tax schedules must balan...
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作者：Epstein, Larry G.; Marinacci, Massimo
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Turin; Collegio Carlo Alberto; University of Turin
摘要：This note provides a behavioral characterization of mutually absolutely continuous multiple priors. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Xiong, Siyang; Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
作者单位：Iowa State University; Northwestern University
摘要：In production economies, the extent to which non-equilibria are blocked depends on the allocation of control rights among shareholders, because a blocking coalition's resources are affected by the firms it jointly owns with outsiders. We formulate a notion of blocking that takes such interdependency problem into account, and we prove an analog of the Debreu-Scarf theorem for replica production economies. Our theorem differs from theirs in using an additional assumption, which we argue is indis...
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作者：Peters, Michael
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：The no-externalities condition provided in the text is not sufficient for Theorems 3 and 4 when effort is not fully contractable. In the case where the principals cannot contract at all on agent's effort, the condition in the text requires that for any set of alternatives offered by the principal there is one that is at least as good as all other alternatives in the set for the agent no matter what the other principal does, no matter what effort the agent takes, and no matter what the agent's ...
