Coalitions, agreements and efficiency

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Diamantoudi, Effrosyni; Xue, Licun
• 署名单位: Concordia University - Canada; McGill University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.012
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 105-125
• 关键词: Coalition formation; externalities; EFFICIENCY; AGREEMENTS

摘要

If agents negotiate openly and form coalitions, can they reach efficient agreements? We address this issue within a class of coalition formation games with externalities where agents' preferences depend solely on the coalition structure they are associated with. We derive Ray and Vohra's [Equilibrium binding agreements, J. Econ. Theory 73 (1997) 30-78] notion of equilibrium binding agreements using von Neumann and Morgenstern [Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1944] abstract stable set and then extend it to allow for arbitrary coalitional deviations (as opposed to nested deviations assumed originally). We show that, while the extended notion facilitates the attainment of efficient agreements, inefficient agreements can nevertheless arise, even if utility transfers are possible. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.