Competitive-search equilibrium in monetary economies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Faig, Miquel; Huangfu, Xiuhua
• 署名单位: University of Toronto
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.07.015
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 709-718
• 关键词: Competitive search; Monetary search

摘要

Competitive search was recently introduced in monetary economics by Rocheteau and Wright [Money in search equilibrium, in competitive equilibrium, and in competitive search equilibrium, Econometrica 73 (2005) 175-2031. We extend their work by eliminating the restriction that the fees market makers charge to enter a submarket must be either non-negative or identical for buyers and sellers. Without this restriction, buyers pay a positive fee to enter the submarket they visit and nothing else when they meet a seller. Sellers are remunerated by the market makers from the entry fees collected from the buyers. This trading arrangement allows buyers to perfectly predict their expenses, so the opportunity cost of holding idle money balances is eliminated. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.