Efficiency and equilibrium when preferences are time-inconsistent

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Luttmer, Erzo G. J.; Mariotti, Thomas
• 署名单位: Universite PSL; Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.07.004
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 493-506
• 关键词: time-inconsistent preferences; competitive equilibrium; Pareto efficiency

摘要

We consider an exchange economy with time-inconsistent consumers whose preferences are additively separable. If consumers have identical discount factors, then allocations that are Pareto efficient at the initial date are also renegotiation-proof. In an economy with a sequence of markets, competitive equilibria are Pareto efficient in this sense, and for generic endowments, only if preferences are locally homothetic. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.