Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: McAdams, David
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.07.002
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 144-166
• 关键词: First-price auction; uniqueness; affiliation; interdependent values; all-pay auction

摘要

The first-price auction has a unique monotone pure strategy equilibrium when there are n symmetric risk-averse bidders having affiliated types and interdependent values. (C) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.