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作者：Lagos, Ricardo; Rocheteau, Guillaume
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; New York University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland
摘要：We construct a model where capital competes with fiat money as a medium of exchange, and establish conditions on fundamentals under which fiat money can be both valued and socially beneficial. When the socially efficient stock of capital is too low to provide the liquidity agents need, they overaccumulate productive assets to use as media of exchange. When this is the case, there exists a monetary equilibrium that dominates the nonmonetary one in terms of welfare. Under the Friedman Rule, fiat...
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作者：Zhu, Tao
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：Search is embedded in an overlapping-generations model. The young participate in a centralized market, and then are matched in pairs in a decentralized market. The old only participate in the centralized market. If the buyer's bargaining power in pairwise trade is close to unity and if the old are risk averse, then the golden-rule rate of money transfer is positive. Such risk aversion, the pairwise meetings, and dependence of the young's saving on the rate of return are necessary for this resu...
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作者：Bilbiie, Florin O.
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; University of Oxford
摘要：This paper incorporates limited asset markets participation in dynamic general equilibrium and develops a simple analytical framework for monetary policy analysis. Aggregate dynamics and stability properties of an otherwise standard business cycle model depend nonlinearly on the degree of asset market participation. While 'moderate' participation rates strengthen the role of monetary policy, low enough participation causes an inversion of results dictated by conventional wisdom. The slope of t...
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作者：Bernhardt, Dan; Taub, Baft
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：We integrate a monopolist dual trader into a dynamic model of speculation. In static settings, [J.-C. Rochet, J.-L. Vila, Insider trading without normality, Rev. Econ. Stud. 61 (1994), 131-152] establish an irrelevance result - expected equilibrium outcomes are the same whether the monopolist speculator sees liquidity trade or not; and Roell [Dual-capacity trading and market quality, J. Finan. Intermediation (1990),105-124] shows that with multiple speculators, dual trading benefits liquidity ...
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作者：Berger, Ulrich
作者单位：University of Vienna
摘要：Fictitious play is a classical learning process for games, and games with strategic complementarities are an important class including many economic applications. Knowledge about convergence properties of fictitious play in this class of games is scarce, however. Beyond games with a unique equilibrium, global convergence has only been claimed for games with diminishing returns [V. Krishna, Learning in games with strategic complementarities. HBS Working Paper 92-073, Harvard University, 1992]. ...
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作者：Boadway, Robin; Jacquet, Laurence
作者单位：Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); Queens University - Canada
摘要：Using the Mirrlees optimal income tax model under maximin, we derive fairly mild conditions for a decreasing marginal tax rate throughout the skill distribution with no bunching, a strictly concave tax function in income and a single-peaked average tax schedule. Assuming additive preferences and an isoelastic disutility of labor function, these tax profiles are implied by aggregate skills that are non-decreasing with the skill level. If preferences are quasilinear in leisure or in consumption,...
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作者：Matsushima, Hitoshi
作者单位：University of Tokyo
摘要：This paper investigates unique implementation in large economies with incomplete information and interdependent values; we degenerate the common knowledge assumptions and assume that a central planner is unaware of the specifications of an environment. With a minor restriction on the class of environments, we demonstrate that there exists a detail-free mechanism that virtually implements competitive allocations with complete information in twice iterative dominance, irrespective of how the env...
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作者：Podczeck, Konrad; Yannelis, Nicholas C.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Vienna
摘要：The traditional deterministic general equilibrium theory with infinitely many commodities cannot cover economics with private information constraints on the consumption sets. We bring the level of asymmetric information equilibrium theory at par with that of the deterministic one. In particular, we establish results on equilibrium existence for exchange economies with asymmetric (differential) information and with an infinite dimensional commodity space. Our new equilibrium existence theorems ...
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作者：Severinov, Sergei
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：In this paper I study mechanism design by an informed principal. I show that generically this problem has an ex-post efficient solution. In the equilibrium mechanism, the informed principal appropriates all expected social surplus, with each type of her getting all expected social surplus conditional on that type. This outcome is supported as a perfect sequential equilibrium of the informed principal game when the joint probability distribution from which the agents' types are drawn satisfies ...
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作者：Mailath, George J.; Noeldeke, Georg
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Basel
摘要：We study market breakdown in a finance context under extreme adverse selection with and without competitive pricing. Adverse selection is extreme if for any price there are informed agent types with whom uninformed agents prefer not to trade. Market breakdown occurs when no trade is the only equilibrium outcome. We present a necessary and sufficient condition for market breakdown. If the condition holds, then trade is not viable. If the condition fails, then trade can occur under competitive p...
