Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency (vol 111, pg 88, 2003)

• 成果类型: Correction
• 署名作者: Peters, Michael
• 署名单位: University of British Columbia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.003
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 594-595
• 关键词: Common agency; Menu

摘要

The no-externalities condition provided in the text is not sufficient for Theorems 3 and 4 when effort is not fully contractable. In the case where the principals cannot contract at all on agent's effort, the condition in the text requires that for any set of alternatives offered by the principal there is one that is at least as good as all other alternatives in the set for the agent no matter what the other principal does, no matter what effort the agent takes, and no matter what the agent's type. In fact, a stronger condition is required. For any set of alternatives offered by a principal, each of the choices within this set that is at least as good for the agent as any other choice within the set must remain so no matter what actions the other principals take, no matter what effort the agent takes, and no matter what the agent's type. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.