Rationalizability of choice functions by game trees

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Xu, Yongsheng; Zhou, Lin
• 署名单位: University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Shanghai Jiao Tong University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.01.002
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 548-556
• 关键词: choice function; rationalizability; game tree; separability; divergence consistency

摘要

Collective choices are often cyclic and cannot be rationalized by maximization of a single linear ordering. In this paper, we identify conditions under which collective choices, potentially cyclic, can be rationalized by extensive games with perfect information. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.