Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bose, Subir; Zhao, Jinhua
• 署名单位: Iowa State University; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.05.007
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 357-381
• 关键词: correlated signals; Rent extraction

摘要

We study the mechanism design problem when the principal can condition the agent's transfers on the realization of ex post signals that are correlated with the agent's types. Cremer and McLean [Econometrica 53(1985) 345-361; 56(1988) 1247-1257], McAfee and Reny [Econometrica 60(2)(1992) 395-421], and Riordan and Sappington [J. Econ. Theory, 45(1988) 189-199] studied situations where the signals are such that full surplus can be extracted from every agent type. We study optimal utilization of the signals when there are fewer signals than types and the Riordan and Sappington conditions do not always hold. For some special cases, we show the level of surplus that can be extracted, and identify the agent types who obtain rent. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.