Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gromb, Denis; Martimort, David
• 署名单位: University of London; London Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.01.003
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 271-299
• 关键词: expertise; ORGANIZATION; collusion

摘要

We study the optimal design of incentive contracts for experts in different collusion environments, and explore implications for the organization of delegated expertise. We consider a principal relying on experts to gather and report two signals about a project's value. The principal can have a single expert gather both signals or two experts gather one signal each. We show that absent collusion, the multiexpert organization dominates the single expert organization. However, this ranking is reversed when the experts can collude among themselves (horizontal collusion) and with the principal (vertical collusion). (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.