Bilateral bargaining in networks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Polanski, Arnold
• 署名单位: Queens University Belfast
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.01.006
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 557-565
• 关键词: buyer-seller networks; graph decomposition

摘要

Each connected pair of nodes in a network can jointly produce one unit of surplus. A maximum number of linked nodes is selected in every period to bargain bilaterally over the division of the surplus, according to the protocol proposed by Rubinstein and Wollinsky [Equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining, Econometrica 53 (1985) 1133-1150]. All pairs, which reach an agreement, obtain the (discounted) payoffs and are removed from the network. This bargaining game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium that induces the Dulmage-Mendelsohn decomposition (partition) of the bipartite network (of the set of nodes in this network). (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.