Anonymity and individual risk

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Labadie, Pamela
• 署名单位: George Washington University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2009.05.009
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 2440-2453
• 关键词: Adverse selection; Retrading; Anonymous equilibrium

摘要

Adverse selection economies with private information are generally studied under the assumption that contracts are exclusive. That is, retrading is prohibited. An alternative market mechanism, the anonymous mechanism, is studied here. Risk averse agents trade contingent claims directly and side markets are in equilibrium. The result is the anonymous equilibrium. The anonymous equilibrium results in a set of endogenous transfers and subsidies. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.