Optimal collusion-proof auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Che, Yeon-Koo; Kim, Jinwoo
• 署名单位: Yonsei University; Columbia University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.07.004
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 565-603
• 关键词: Collusion on participation; Subgroup collusion; Multiple bidding cartels; An exclusion principle

摘要

We study an optimal collusion-proof auction in an environment where subsets of bidders may, collude not just on their bids but also on their participation. Despite their ability to collude on participation, informational asymmetry facing the potential colluders can be exploited significantly to weaken their collusive power. The second-best auction - i.e., the optimal auction in a collusion-free, environment - can be made collusion-proof, if at least one bidder is not collusive, or there are multiple bidding cartels, or the second-best outcome involves a non-trivial probability of the object not being sold. Regardless, optimal collusion-proof auction prescribes non-trivial exclusion of collusive bidders, i.e., a refusal to sell to any collusive bidder with positive probability. (C) 2008 Published by Elsevier Inc.