Reputation and exogenous private learning

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wiseman, Thomas
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2009.01.005
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 1352-1357
• 关键词: Reputation; Chain store game; learning; Noisy signals

摘要

Short-run competitors in the chain store game receive noisy signals of the long-run incumbent firm's type. The history of signals, which in the limit is fully revealing, is observable to the competitors but possibly not to the incumbent. As long as there is sufficient noise in the signals, then in any equilibrium a patient weak incumbent obtains a payoff strictly higher than her minmax payoff. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.