Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kojima, Fuhito; Manea, Mihai
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2009.09.002
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 106-123
• 关键词: Random assignment; probabilistic serial mechanism; ordinal efficiency; Exact strategy-proofness in large markets; random serial dictatorship

摘要

The probabilistic serial mechanism (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001 [9]) is ordinally efficient but not strategy-proof. We study incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism for large assignment problems. We establish that for a fixed set of object types and an agent with a given expected utility function, if there are sufficiently many copies of each object type, then reporting ordinal preferences truthfully is a weakly dominant strategy for the agent (regardless of the number of other agents and their preferences). The non-manipulability and the ordinal efficiency of the probabilistic serial mechanism support its implementation instead of random serial dictatorship in large assignment problems. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.