An efficiency theorem for incompletely known preferences

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carroll, Gabriel
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.03.015
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 2463-2470
• 关键词: dominance; Ordinal efficiency welfare theorem; Pareto efficiency; Unknown preferences

摘要

There are n agents who have von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions on a finite set of alternatives A. Each agent i's utility function is known to lie in the nonempty, convex, relatively open set U-i. Suppose L is a lottery on A that is undominated, meaning that there is no other lottery that is guaranteed to Pareto dominate L no matter what the true utility functions are. Then, there exist utility functions u(i) is an element of U-i for which L is Pareto efficient. This result includes the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem as a special case. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.