Matching through position auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Johnson, T. R.
• 署名单位: University of Notre Dame
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.009
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 1700-1713
• 关键词: Matching; auctions; mechanism design; intermediation

摘要

Using a mechanism design framework, we characterize how a profit-maximizing intermediary can design matching markets when each agent is privately informed about his quality as a partner. Sufficient conditions are provided that ensure a version of positive assortative matching (what we call truncated positive assortative matching) maximizes profits. Under these conditions, all-pay position auctions always implement the profit-maximizing allocation. Winners-pay position auctions, however, only do so in sufficiently large markets. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.