Imitating cooperation and the formation of long-term relationships

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schumacher, Heiner
• 署名单位: Goethe University Frankfurt
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.008
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 409-417
• 关键词: Prisoner's dilemma; imitation; Random matching; Relationships

摘要

We study the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma with the option to maintain or to quit relationships. We show that if agents imitate successful strategies infrequently, defection is not dynamically stable and cooperation emerges regardless of the initial distribution of strategies. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.