Information acquisition during a Dutch auction

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Miettinen, Paavo
• 署名单位: Bank of Finland
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.018
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 1213-1225
• 关键词: Auctions; information acquisition; revenue equivalence

摘要

In this paper we consider equilibrium behavior in a Dutch (descending price) auction when the bidders are uninformed of their valuations with probability q and can acquire information about their valuation with a positive cost during the auction. We assume that the information acquisition activity is covert. We characterize the equilibrium behavior in the setting where bidders are ex-ante symmetric and have independent private values. We show that when the number of bidders is large the Dutch auction produces more revenue than the first price auction. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.