Search theory, competitive equilibrium, and the Nash bargaining solution

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cho, In-Koo; Matsui, Akihiko
• 署名单位: University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Tokyo
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.003
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 1659-1688
• 关键词: Matching; search; Undominated strategy equilibrium; Nash bargaining solution

摘要

We investigate a canonical search-theoretic model without entry. Two agents are randomly matched with a long side being rationed. The matched agents face a pair of randomly drawn non-transferable payoffs, and then choose whether or not to form a partnership subject to a small probability of exogenous break down. As this probability and friction vanish, the Nash bargaining solution emerges as the unique undominated strategy equilibrium outcome if the mass of each party is the same. If the size of one party is larger than the other, the short side extracts the entire surplus, a sharp contrast to Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) [16]. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.