Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with many agents

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Momi, Takeshi
• 署名单位: Doshisha University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.10.008
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 1237-1254
• 关键词: Social choice; strategy-proofness; Pareto-efficiency; exchange economy

摘要

We show that in pure exchange economies there exists no Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanism that ensures positive consumption for all agents. We also show that a Pareto-efficient, strategy-proof, and non-bossy allocation mechanism is dictatorial. We further show that in three-agent economies, the allocation given by a Pareto-efficient, strategy-proof, and non-dictatorial mechanism depends only on one agent's preference who is always allocated zero consumption. That is, in three-agent economies, Zhou's (1991) [14] conjecture is true and any Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof mechanism is of Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein's (1981) [10] type. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.