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作者：Bikhchandani, Sushil; Segal, Uzi
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Boston College; University of Warwick
摘要：Preferences may arise from regret, i.e., from comparisons with alternatives forgone by the decision maker. When each outcome in a random variable is compared with the parallel outcome in an alternative random variable, regret preferences are transitive if they are expected utility. In this paper we show that when the choice set consists of pairwise statistically independent lotteries and the regret associated with each outcome is with respect to the entire alternative distribution, then transi...
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作者：Golosov, Mikhail; Skreta, Vasiliki; Tsyvinski, Aleh; Wilson, Andrea
作者单位：Yale University; New York University
摘要：This paper studies strategic information transmission in a finite horizon environment where, each period, a privately informed expert sends a message and a decision-maker takes an action. We show that communication in this dynamic environment drastically differs from a one-shot game. Our main result is that, under certain conditions, full information revelation is possible. We provide a constructive method to build such fully revealing equilibria; our result obtains with rich communication, in...
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作者：Pasquariello, Paolo
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We study equilibrium trading strategies and market quality in an economy in which speculators display preferences consistent with Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, [39]; Tversky and Kahneman, [631), i.e., loss aversion and mild risk seeking in losses. Loss aversion (risk seeking in losses) induces speculators to trade less (more), and less cautiously (more aggressively), with their private information but also makes them less (more) inclined to purchase private information when it is cost...
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作者：Gormley, Todd A.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Using a theoretical model that incorporates asymmetric information and differing comparative advantages among lenders, this paper analyzes the impact of lender entry on credit access and aggregate net output. The model shows that lender entry has the potential to create a segmented market that increases credit access for those firms targeted by the new lenders but potentially reduces credit access for all other firms. The overall impact on net output depends on the distribution of firms, the r...
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作者：Saporiti, Alejandro
作者单位：University of Manchester
摘要：We study a social choice model with partially honest agents, and we show that strategy-proofness is a necessary and sufficient condition to achieve secure implementation. This result provides a behavioral foundation for the rectangularity property; and it offers as a by-product a revelation principle for secure implementation with partial honesty. We apply the implementation concept to a single-crossing voting environment, and we prove that it characterizes, in combination with unanimity, the ...
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作者：Sawa, Ryoji; Zusai, Dai
作者单位：University of Aizu; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University
摘要：We consider deterministic evolutionary dynamics under imitative revision protocols. We allow agents to have different aspiration levels in the imitative protocols where their aspiration levels are not observable to other agents. We show that the distribution of strategies becomes statistically independent of the aspiration level eventually in the long run. Thus, long-run properties of homogeneous imitative dynamics hold as well, despite heterogeneity in aspiration levels. (c) 2014 Elsevier Inc...
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作者：Soenmez, Tayfun; Uenver, M. Utku
作者单位：Boston College
摘要：Although a pilot national live-donor kidney exchange program was recently launched in the US, the kidney shortage is increasing faster than ever. A new solution paradigm is able to incorporate compatible pairs in exchange. In this paper, we consider an exchange framework that has both compatible and incompatible pairs, and patients are indifferent over compatible pairs. Only two-way exchanges are permitted because of institutional constraints. We explore the structure of Pareto-efficient match...
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作者：Jaskiewicz, Anna; Nowak, Andrzej S.
作者单位：Wroclaw University of Science & Technology; University of Zielona Gora
摘要：In this paper, we study intergenerational stochastic games that can be viewed as a special class of overlapping generations models under uncertainty. Making use of the theorem of Dvoretzky, Wald and Wolfowitz [27] from the statistical decision theory, we obtain new results on stationary Markov perfect equilibria for the aforementioned games, with a general state space, satisfying rather mild continuity and compactness conditions. A novel feature of our approach is the fact that we consider ris...
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Ishii, Yuhta; Kominers, Scott Duke
作者单位：Harvard University; Harvard University; Harvard University; Harvard University
摘要：We extend the folk theorem of repeated games to two settings in which players' information about others' play arrives with stochastic lags. In our first model, signals are almost-perfect if and when they do arrive, that is, each player either observes an almost-perfect signal of period-t play with some lag or else never sees a signal of period-t play. The second model has the same lag structure, but the information structure corresponds to a lagged form of imperfect public monitoring, and play...
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作者：Favara, Giovanni; Song, Zheng
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; University of Chicago
摘要：We use a user-cost model to study how dispersed information affects the equilibrium house price. In the model, agents are disparately informed about local economic conditions, consume housing services, and speculate on price changes. Optimists, who expect high house price growth, buy in anticipation of capital gains; pessimists, who expect capital losses, prefer to rent. Because of short-selling constraints on housing, pessimistic expectations are not incorporated in the price of owned houses ...
