Dynamic strategic information transmission

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Golosov, Mikhail; Skreta, Vasiliki; Tsyvinski, Aleh; Wilson, Andrea
• 署名单位: Yale University; New York University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.12.012
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 304-341
• 关键词: Asymmetric information; cheap talk; Dynamic strategic communication; Full information revelation

摘要

This paper studies strategic information transmission in a finite horizon environment where, each period, a privately informed expert sends a message and a decision-maker takes an action. We show that communication in this dynamic environment drastically differs from a one-shot game. Our main result is that, under certain conditions, full information revelation is possible. We provide a constructive method to build such fully revealing equilibria; our result obtains with rich communication, in which non-contiguous types pool together, thereby allowing dynamic manipulation of beliefs. Essentially, conditioning future information release on past actions improves incentives for information revelation. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.