Costly information, entry, and credit access

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gormley, Todd A.
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.06.003
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 633-667
• 关键词: Asymmetric information; COMPETITION; credit; financial liberalization

摘要

Using a theoretical model that incorporates asymmetric information and differing comparative advantages among lenders, this paper analyzes the impact of lender entry on credit access and aggregate net output. The model shows that lender entry has the potential to create a segmented market that increases credit access for those firms targeted by the new lenders but potentially reduces credit access for all other firms. The overall impact on net output depends on the distribution of firms, the relative costs of lenders, and the cost of acquiring information. The model provides new insights into the evidence regarding foreign lenders' entry into emerging markets. (c) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.