Securely implementable social choice rules with partially honest agents

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Saporiti, Alejandro
• 署名单位: University of Manchester
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.006
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 216-228
• 关键词: Secure implementation; Partial honesty; strategy-proofness; Rectangularity; Single-crossing preferences; Representative (median) voter

摘要

We study a social choice model with partially honest agents, and we show that strategy-proofness is a necessary and sufficient condition to achieve secure implementation. This result provides a behavioral foundation for the rectangularity property; and it offers as a by-product a revelation principle for secure implementation with partial honesty. We apply the implementation concept to a single-crossing voting environment, and we prove that it characterizes, in combination with unanimity, the family of augmented representative voter schemes. (c) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.