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作者：Ales, Laurence; Sleet, Christopher
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：We analyze an equilibrium concept called revision-proofness for infinite-horizon games played by a dynasty of players. Revision-proofness requires strategies to be robust to joint deviations by multiple players and is a refinement of sub-game perfection. Sub-game perfect paths that can only be sustained by reversion to paths with payoffs below those of an alternative path are not revision-proof. However, for the important class of quasi-recursive games careful construction of off-equilibrium p...
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作者：Quint, Daniel
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：I study price competition in settings where end products are combinations of components supplied by different monopolists, nesting standard models of perfect complements and imperfect substitutes. I show sufficient conditions for a discrete-choice demand system to yield demand for each product which is log-concave in price, and has log-increasing differences in own and another product's price, leading to strong comparative statics results. Many results familiar from simple models, like the pri...
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作者：Cao, Dan
作者单位：Georgetown University
摘要：This paper explores the continuous time and continuous space model of racing under uncertainty put forward by Budd, Harris, and Vickers [4] and allows for potentially asymmetric players. To prove the existence of Markov perfect equilibria, I use a boundary value problem formulation which is novel to the dynamic competition literature. In addition, by providing a new and intuitive definition of the pivot of an equilibrium, I show that equilibrium strategies exhibit the discouragement effect sim...
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作者：Koufopoulos, Kostas; Kozhan, Roman
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：We consider a model of competitive insurance markets involving both asymmetric information and ambiguity about the accident probability. We show that there can exist a full-insurance pooling equilibrium. We also present an example where an increase in ambiguity leads to a strict Pareto improvement. Higher ambiguity relaxes high-risks' incentive compatibility constraint and allows low risks to buy more insurance. Higher ambiguity also deteriorates low risks' expected utility from holding an unc...
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作者：Ahn, David S.; Oliveros, Santiago
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Essex
摘要：Should two issues be decided jointly by a single committee or in separately by different committees? Similarly, should two defendants be tried together in a joint trial or tried separately in severed trials? Multiplicity of issues or defendants introduces novel strategic considerations. As in the standard Condorcet Jury Theorem, we consider large committees with common values and incomplete information. Our main result is that the joint trial by a single committee can aggregate information if ...
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作者：Pai, Mallesh M.; Vohra, Rakesh
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We study the sale of an indivisible good to liquidity constrained buyers: they cannot pay more than their budget regardless of their valuation. Both valuation and budget are private information. We derive the symmetric revenue maximizing and constrained efficient auctions in this setting. We show an implementation via a modified all-pay auction. The highest bidder need not win the good outright, or, stated differently, the auction has pooling, despite the usual regularity conditions. Subsidizi...
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作者：Staudigl, Mathias; Weidenholzer, Simon
作者单位：University of Bielefeld; University of Essex
摘要：We consider a co-evolutionary model of social coordination and network formation where agents may decide on an action in a 2 x 2-coordination game and on whom to establish costly links to. We find that if agents may only support a limited number of links payoff dominant conventions will emerge in the long run, contrasting the case of unconstrained interactions where risk dominant conventions arise for a wide range of parameters. Under constrained iterations, already a small number of agents ch...
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作者：Nora, Vladyslav; Uno, Hiroshi
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; Osaka Metropolitan University
摘要：We provide a new sufficient condition for the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997) [11], Moths and Ui (2005) [15]. The condition is formulated for games with a saddle function. A saddle function is a real-valued function on the set of action profiles such that there is a single player for whom minimizing the function implies choosing her best response, and for the other players maximizing the function implies choosing their best res...
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作者：Albuquerque, Rui; Miao, Jianjun
作者单位：Boston University; Universidade Catolica Portuguesa; Boston University; Central University of Finance & Economics; Zhejiang University
摘要：This paper provides a dynamic rational expectations equilibrium model in which investors have heterogeneous information and investment opportunities. Informed investors privately receive advance information about future earnings that is unrelated to current earnings. In response to good advance information, stock prices increase and informed investors act as trend chasers, increasing their investment in stocks. Informed investors also buy other investment opportunities that are positively corr...
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作者：Buechel, Berno; Hellmann, Tim; Pichler, Michael M.
作者单位：University of Hamburg; University of Bielefeld
摘要：We consider an overlapping generations model where continuous cultural traits are transmitted from an adult generation to the children. A weighted social network describes how children are influenced not only by their parents but also by other role models within the society. Parents can invest into the purposeful socialization of their children by strategically displaying a cultural trait (which need not coincide with their true cultural trait). We observe a cultural substitution effect when p...
