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作者：Dong, Mei; Jiang, Janet Hua
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney; Bank of Canada
摘要：We study price posting with undirected search in a search-theoretic monetary model with divisible money and divisible goods. Ex ante homogeneous buyers experience match-specific preference shocks in bilateral trades. The shocks follow a continuous uniform distribution, and the realizations of the shocks are private information. We show that there exists a unique monetary equilibrium for generic values of the inflation rate. In equilibrium, each seller posts a continuous pricing schedule that e...
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作者：Schoonbroodt, Alice; Tertilt, Michele
作者单位：University of Iowa; University of Mannheim; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：Is there an economic rationale for pronatalist policies? We propose and analyze a particular market failure that leads to inefficiently low fertility in equilibrium. The friction is caused by the lack of ownership of children: if parents have no claim on their children's income, the private benefit from producing a child can be smaller than the social benefit. We analyze an overlapping-generations (OLG) model with fertility choice and parental altruism. Ownership is modeled as a minimum constr...
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作者：Andolfatto, David; Berentsen, Aleksander; Waller, Christopher
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis; Simon Fraser University; University of Basel; University of Notre Dame
摘要：Information about asset quality is often not disclosed to asset markets. What principles determine when a financial regulator should disclose or withhold information? We explore this question using a risk-sharing model with intertemporal trade and limited commitment. Information about future asset returns is available to society, but legislation dictates whether this information is disclosed or not. In our environment, nondisclosure is generally desirable except when individuals can access hid...
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作者：Gorton, Gary B.; He, Ping; Huang, Lixin
作者单位：Yale University; Tsinghua University; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University
摘要：We study an infinite-horizon Lucas tree model where a manager is hired to tend to the trees and is compensated with a fraction of the trees' output. The manager trades shares with investors and makes an effort that determines the distribution of the output. When the manager is less (more) risk-averse than the investors, managerial trading results in a less (more) volatile stock price and a lower (higher) risk premium. Trading between the manager and investors acts as an indirect renegotiation ...
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作者：Ehlers, Lars; Hafalir, Isa E.; Yenmez, M. Bumin; Yildirim, Muhammed A.
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; Carnegie Mellon University; Harvard University
摘要：Controlled choice over public schools attempts giving parents selection options while maintaining diversity of different student types. In practice, diversity constraints are often enforced by setting hard upper bounds and hard lower bounds for each student type. We demonstrate that, with hard bounds, there might not exist assignments that satisfy standard fairness and non-wastefulness properties; and only constrained non-wasteful assignments that are fair for same type students can be guarant...
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作者：Maattanen, Niku; Tervio, Marko
作者单位：Aalto University
摘要：We present a framework for studying the relation between the distributions of income and house prices that is based on an assignment model where households are heterogeneous by incomes and houses by quality. Each household owns one house and wishes to live in one house; thus everyone is potentially both a buyer and a seller. In equilibrium, the distribution of prices depends on both distributions in a tractable but nontrivial manner. We show how the impact of increased income inequality on hou...
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作者：Gerardi, Dino; Hoerner, Johannes; Maestri, Lucas
作者单位：University of Turin; Collegio Carlo Alberto; Yale University
摘要：This paper characterizes the set of equilibrium payoffs in bargaining with interdependent values when the informed party makes all offers, as discounting vanishes. The seller of a good is informed of its quality, which affects both his cost and the buyer's valuation, but the buyer is not. To characterize this payoff set, we derive an upper bound, using mechanism design with limited commitment. We then prove that this upper bound is tight, by showing that all its extreme points are equilibrium ...
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作者：Gallo, Edoardo
作者单位：University of Cambridge; University of Cambridge
摘要：Individuals learn by chit-chatting with others as a by-product of their online and offline activities. Social plugins are an example in the online context: they embed information from a friend, acquaintance or even a stranger on a web page and the information is usually independent of the content of the web page. We formulate a novel framework to investigate how the speed of learning by chit-chat depends on the structure of the environment. A network represents the environment that individuals...
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作者：Oyarzun, Carlos
作者单位：University of Queensland
摘要：I provide a full characterization of the set of absolutely expedient learning rules introduced in Borgers et al. [2]. The expected change in the expected payoff can be written as a quadratic form on the vector of relative expected payoffs of the strategies. This permits use of standard linear algebra arguments to provide a characterization in terms of the matrix defining this quadratic form. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Perkins, S.; Leslie, D. S.
作者单位：University of Bristol
摘要：Continuous action space games are ubiquitous in economics. However, whilst learning dynamics in normal form games with finite action sets are now well studied, it is not until recently that their continuous action space counterparts have been examined. We extend stochastic fictitious play to the continuous action space framework. In normal form games with finite action sets the limiting behaviour of a discrete time learning process is often studied using its continuous time counterpart via sto...
