Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fudenberg, Drew; Ishii, Yuhta; Kominers, Scott Duke
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Harvard University; Harvard University; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.09.004
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 487-514
• 关键词: Repeated games; folk theorem; private monitoring; Observation lag

摘要

We extend the folk theorem of repeated games to two settings in which players' information about others' play arrives with stochastic lags. In our first model, signals are almost-perfect if and when they do arrive, that is, each player either observes an almost-perfect signal of period-t play with some lag or else never sees a signal of period-t play. The second model has the same lag structure, but the information structure corresponds to a lagged form of imperfect public monitoring, and players are allowed to communicate via cheap-talk messages at the end of each period. In each case, we construct equilibria in delayed-response strategies, which ensure that players wait long enough to respond to signals that with high probability all relevant signals are received before players respond. To do so, we extend past work on private monitoring to obtain folk theorems despite the small residual amount of private information. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.