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作者：Helsley, Robert W.; Zenou, Yves
作者单位：University of British Columbia; Stockholm University; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); University of Southampton
摘要：We examine how interaction choices depend on the interplay of social and physical distance, and show that agents who are more central in the social network, or are located closer to the geographic center of interaction, choose higher levels of interactions in equilibrium. As a result, the level of interactivity in the economy as a whole will rise with the density of links in the social network and with the degree to which agents are clustered in physical space. When agents can choose geographi...
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作者：Casajus, Andre; Huettner, Frank
作者单位：HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management
摘要：The principle of weak monotonicity for cooperative games states that if a game changes so that the worth of the grand coalition and some player's marginal contribution to all coalitions increase or stay the same, then this player's payoff should not decrease. We investigate the class of values that satisfy efficiency, symmetry, and weak monotonicity. It turns out that this class coincides with the class of egalitarian Shapley values. Thus, weak monotonicity reflects the nature of the egalitari...
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作者：Eguia, Jon X.; Peski, Marcin
作者单位：University of Bristol; University of Toronto
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作者：Allison, Blake A.; Lepore, Jason J.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; California State University System; California Polytechnic State University San Luis Obispo
摘要：We introduce the concept of disjoint payoff matching which can be used to show that the mixed extension of a compact game is payoff secure. By putting minor structure on the discontinuities, we need only check payoffs at each strategy rather than in neighborhoods of each strategy profile, placing minimal restriction on the payoffs at points of discontinuity. The results are used to verify existence of equilibrium in a general model of Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All ri...
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作者：Carmona, Guilherme; Podezeck, Konrad
作者单位：University of Surrey; University of Vienna
摘要：Balder's [6] model of games with a measure space of players is integrated with the line of research on finite-player games with discontinuous payoff functions which follows Reny [47]. Specifically, we extend the notion of continuous security, introduced by McLennan, Monteiro & Tourky [38] and Barelli & Meneghel [9] for finite-players games, to games with a measure space of players and establish the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium for such games. A specification of our main existenc...
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作者：Gauthier, Stephane; Laroque, Guy
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; University of London; University College London; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：The paper identifies a necessary and sufficient condition for a deterministic local optimum to be locally improved upon by a stochastic deviation. When this condition is satisfied, a method to construct the stochastic allocations that increase the objective is provided. This technique is applied to a number of adverse selection and moral hazard problems. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Al-Najjar, Nabil I.; Pai, Mallesh M.
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We study decision makers who willingly forgo decision rules that vary finely with available information, even though these decision rules are technologically feasible. We model this behavior as a consequence of using classical, frequentist methods to draw robust inferences from data. Coarse decision making then arises to mitigate the problem of over-fitting the data. The resulting behavior tends to be biased towards simplicity: decision makers choose models that are statistically simple, in a ...
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作者：Del Boca, Daniela; Flinn, Christopher J.
作者单位：University of Turin; New York University; Collegio Carlo Alberto
摘要：There is some controversy in the field of household economics regarding the efficiency of household decisions. We make the point that a flexible specification of spousal preferences and the household production technology precludes the possibility of using revealed preference data on household time allocations to determine the manner in which spouses interact: efficiently or inefficiently. Under strong, but standard, assumptions regarding marriage market equilibria, marital sorting patterns ca...
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作者：Boyd, John H.; Hakenes, Hendrik
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Bonn; Max Planck Society
摘要：We construct a model of the banking firm with inside and outside equity and use it to study bank behavior and regulatory policy during crises. In our model, a bank can increase the risk of its asset portfolio (risk shift), convert bank assets to the personal benefit of the bank manager (loot), or do both. A regulator has three policy tools: it can restrict the bank's investment choices; it can make looting more costly; and it can force banks to hold more equity. Capital regulation may increase...
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作者：Goeree, Jacob K.; Lien, Yuanchuan
作者单位：University of Zurich; University of Technology Sydney; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：We provide a Bayes-Nash equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction (SAA) when local bidders interested in a single item compete against global bidders interested in aggregating many items. We first assume that each local bidder values only a specific item, e.g. the license for the region where it has monopoly power, and that global bidders' valuation functions are convex. For this environment we show that a global bidder faces an exposure problem with adverse consequences for r...
