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作者：Ghosh, Arpita; Hummel, Patrick
作者单位：Cornell University; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
摘要：We investigate the widely-used rank-order mechanism for displaying user-generated content, where contributions are displayed on a webpage in decreasing order of their ratings, in a game-theoretic model where strategic contributors benefit from attention and have a cost to quality. We show that the lowest quality elicited by this rank-order mechanism in any mixed-strategy equilibrium becomes optimal as the available attention diverges. Additionally, these equilibrium qualities are higher, with ...
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作者：Myerson, Roger B.
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：We consider a simple overlapping-generations model with risk-averse financial agents subject to moral hazard. Efficient contracts for such financial intermediaries involve back-loaded late-career rewards. Compared to the analogous model with risk-neutral agents, risk aversion tends to reduce the growth of agents' responsibilities over their careers. This moderation of career growth rates can reduce the amplitude of the widest credit cycles, but it also can cause small deviations from steady st...
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作者：Kraft, Holger; Seifried, Frank Thomas
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt; University of Kaiserslautern
摘要：We establish a convergence theorem that shows that discrete-time recursive utility, as developed by Kreps and Porteus [21], converges to stochastic differential utility, as introduced by Duffle and Epstein [10], in the continuous-time limit of vanishing grid size. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Acharya, Viral; Bisin, Alberto
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; New York University
摘要：We study financial markets where agents share risks, but have incentives to default and their financial positions might not be transparent, that is, might not be mutually observable. We show that a lack of position transparency results in a counterparty risk externality, that manifests itself in the form of excess leverage, in that parties take on short positions that lead to levels of default risk that are higher than Pareto efficient ones. This externality is absent when trading is organized...
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作者：Allen, Franklin; Carletti, Elena; Gale, Douglas
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; European University Institute; Bocconi University; New York University
摘要：Most analyses of banking crises assume that banks use real contracts but in practice contracts are nominal. We consider a standard banking model with aggregate return risk, aggregate liquidity risk and idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. With non-contingent nominal deposit contracts, a decentralized banking system can achieve the first-best efficient allocation if the central bank accommodates the demands of the private sector for fiat money. Price level variations allow full sharing of aggregate ...
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作者：Chabi-Yo, Fousseni; Leisen, Dietmar P. J.; Renault, Eric
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz; Brown University
摘要：This paper characterizes the equilibrium demand and risk premiums in the presence of skewness risk. We extend the classical mean-variance two-fund separation theorem to a three-fund separation theorem. The additional fund is the skewness portfolio, i.e. a portfolio that gives the optimal hedge of the squared market return; it contributes to the skewness risk premium through co-variation with the squared market return and supports a stochastic discount factor that is quadratic in the market ret...
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作者：Azrieli, Yaron; Shmaya, Eran
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We prove existence of envy-free allocations in markets with heterogenous indivisible goods and money, when a given quantity is supplied from each of the goods and agents have unit demands. We depart from most of the previous literature by allowing agents' preferences over the goods to depend on the entire vector of prices. We then show how our theorem may be applied in two related problems: Existence of envy-free allocations in a version of the cake-cutting problem, and existence of equilibriu...
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作者：Evren, Oezguer
作者单位：New Economic School
摘要：I characterize the class of (possibly incomplete) preference relations over lotteries which can be represented by a compact set of (continuous) expected utility functions that preserve both indifferences and strict preferences. This finding contrasts with the representation theorem of Dubra, Maccheroni and Ok [16] which typically delivers some functions which do not respect strict preferences. For a preference relation of the sort that I consider in this paper, my representation theorem reduce...
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作者：Al-Najjar, Nabil I.; De Castro, Luciano
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：A preference is invariant with respect to a set of transformations if the ranking of acts is unaffected by reshuffling the states under these transformations. For example, transformations may correspond to the set of finite permutations, or the shift in a dynamic choice model. Our main result is that any invariant preference must be parametric: there is a unique sufficient set of parameters such that the preference ranks acts according to their expected utility given the parameters. Parameters...
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作者：Goldluecke, Susanne; Schmitz, Patrick W.
作者单位：University of Mannheim; University of Cologne; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：Consider a seller who can make an observable but non-contractible investment to improve an intermediate good that is specialized to a particular buyer's needs. The buyer then makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller. The seller has private information about the fraction of the ex post surplus that he can realize on his own. Compared to a situation with complete information, additional investment incentives are generated by the seller's desire to pretend a strong outside option. On the o...
