Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Velez, Rodrigo A.
• 署名单位: Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.006
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1114-1129
• 关键词: Equal-income competitive social choice functions; Sincere and sophisticated agents; indivisible goods; bounded rationality

摘要

We study the simultaneous direct revelation mechanism associated with each equal-income competitive social choice function in the allocation of objects and money among sincere and strategic agents. Strategic agents take advantage of sincere agents. They non-cooperatively coordinate on the equal-income competitive allocations for the true preferences that are Pareto undorninated for them within the set of equal-income competitive allocations. Sincere agents are protected to some extent, however. Their welfare is usually above their maximin payoff. (c) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.