Banking bubbles and financial crises

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Miao, Jianjun; Wang, Pengfei
• 署名单位: Boston University; Central University of Finance & Economics; Zhejiang University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.02.004
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 763-792
• 关键词: Banking bubbles; multiple equilibria; financial crises; Credit policies; Capital requirements

摘要

This paper develops a tractable macroeconomic model with a banking sector in which banks face endogenous borrowing constraints. There is no uncertainty about economic fundamentals. Banking bubbles can emerge through a positive feedback loop mechanism. Changes in household confidence can cause the bubbles to burst, resulting in a financial crisis. Credit policy can mitigate economic downturns. The welfare gain is larger when the government interventions are more front loaded, given that the government injects the same amount of liquidity in terms of present value. Bank capital requirements can prevent the formation of banking bubbles by limiting leverage, but if too restrictive will lead to less lending and hence lower production. (c) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.