Coalitions, tipping points and the speed of evolution

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Newton, Jonathan; Angus, Simon D.
• 署名单位: University of Sydney; Monash University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.003
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 172-187
• 关键词: evolution; coalition; Social norm; REFORM; conservatism; networks

摘要

This study considers waiting times for populations to achieve efficient social coordination. Belloc and Bowles [1] conjecture that coalitional behavior will hasten such coordination. This turns out to be true when every member of the population interacts with every other member, but does not extend to more complex networks of interaction. Although it is in the interest of every player to coordinate on a single globally efficient norm, coalitional behavior at a local level can greatly slow, as well as hasten, convergence to efficiency. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.