Contracts versus salaries in matching: A general result

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schlegel, Jan Christoph
• 署名单位: University of Lausanne
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.015
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 552-573
• 关键词: Matching with contracts; Matching with salaries; Embedding; substitutes; Unilateral substitutes; Bilateral substitutes

摘要

It is shown that a matching market with contracts can be embedded into a matching market with salaries under weaker conditions than substitutability of contracts. In particular, the result applies to the recently studied problem of cadet-to-branch matching. As an application of the embedding result, a new class of mechanisms for matching markets with contracts is defined that generalize the firm-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm to the case where contracts are unilateral substitutes for firms. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.