From imitation to collusion: Long-run learning in a low-information environment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Friedman, Daniel; Huck, Steffen; Oprea, Ryan; Weidenholzer, Simon
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz; University of London; University College London; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; University of Essex
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.10.006
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 185-205
• 关键词: Cournot oligopoly; imitation; learning dynamics; COOPERATION

摘要

We explore the stability of imitation in a 1200-period experimental Cournot game where subjects do not know the payoff function but see the output quantities and payoffs of each oligopolist after every period. In line with theoretical predictions and previous experimental findings, our oligopolies reach highly competitive levels within 50 periods. However, already after 100 periods, quantities start to drop and eventually fall deep into collusive territory without pausing at the Nash equilibrium. Our results demonstrate how groups of subjects can learn their way out of dysfunctional heuristics, and suggest elements for a new theory of how cooperation emerges. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.