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作者：Carroll, Gabriel; Meng, Delong
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We investigate the idea that linear contracts are reliable because they give the same incentives for effort at every point along the contract. We ask whether this reliability leads to a microfoundation for linear contracts, when the principal is profit-maximizing. We consider a principal-agent model with risk neutrality and limited liability, in which the agent observes the realization of a mean-zero shock to output before choosing how much effort to exert. We show that such a model can indeed...
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作者：Benhabib, Jess; Liu, Xuewen; Wang, Pengfei
作者单位：New York University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：We introduce endogenous information acquisition into an otherwise standard business cycle model. In our framework information is a productive input, which is essentially specialized labor, so information acquisition is linked to the labor market and thereby to macroeconomic conditions. We show that when firms acquire information optimally, information acquisition is endogenously procyclical, and therefore economic uncertainty faced by the firms is countercyclical. Two-way feedback exists betwe...
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作者：Babichenko, Yakov; Tamuz, Omer
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：We study the class of potential games that are also graphical games with respect to a given graph G of connections between the players. We show that, up to strategic equivalence, this class of games can be identified with the set of Markov random fields on G. From this characterization, and from the Hammersley-Clifford theorem, it follows that the potentials of such games can be decomposed into local potentials. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Okada, Akira
作者单位：Kyoto University; Hitotsubashi University
摘要：We consider a non-cooperative sequential bargaining game with incomplete information where two players negotiate for mechanisms with ex post verifiable types at the interim stage. We prove the existence of a stationary sequential equilibrium of the bargaining game where the ex post Nash bargaining solution with no delay is asymptotically implemented with probability one. Further, the ex post Nash bargaining solution is a unique outcome of a stationary equilibrium under the property of Independ...
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作者：Ganguli, Jayant; Heifetz, Aviad; Lee, Byung Soo
作者单位：University of Essex; Open University Israel; University of Toronto
摘要：We prove that a universal preference type space exists under more general conditions than those postulated by Epstein and Wang (1996). To wit, it suffices that preferences can be encoded monotonically in rich enough ways by collections of continuous, monotone real-valued functionals over acts, which determine even in discontinuous fashion-the preferences over limit acts. The proof relies on a generalization of the method developed by Heifetz and Samet (1998a). (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights...
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作者：Song, Yangbo
作者单位：The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen
摘要：I study the problem of social learning in a model where agents move sequentially. Each agent receives a private signal about the underlying state of the world, observes the past actions in a neighborhood of individuals, and chooses her action attempting to match the true state. In contrast to the most existing literature that assumes an exogenous observation structure, observation in this paper is endogenous. More specifically, each agent must pay a cost to make any observation and can strateg...
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作者：Saran, Rene
作者单位：Yale NUS College
摘要：We move towards a more robust theory of individual behavior in mechanism design by allowing hierarchies of players with varying but bounded depths of rationality. Specifically, we study (full) implementation with complete information when players are at least rational and at most k-rational, where k >= 2. We show that the set of implementable social choice functions (SCFs) is independent of the upper bound k. In independent domain of preferences (IDP) environments, we obtain a revelation princ...
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作者：Sampson, Thomas
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：The allocation of skilled labor across industries shapes inter-industry wage differences and wage inequality. This paper shows the ranking of industries by workforce skill differs between developed and developing countries and develops a multi-sector assignment model to understand the causes and consequences of this fact. Heterogeneous agents leverage their ability through their span of control over an homogeneous input. In equilibrium, higher skill agents sort into sectors where the cost per ...
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作者：Stinchcombe, Maxwell B.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：Foundations for priors can be grouped in two broad categories: objective, deriving probabilities from observations of similar instances; and subjective, deriving probabilities from the internal consistency of choices. Partial observations of similar instances and the Savage-de Finetti extensions of subjective priors yield objective and subjective sets of priors suitable for modeling choice under ambiguity. These sets are best suited to such modeling when the distribution of the observables, or...
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作者：Wang, Chong; Wang, Neng; Yang, Jinqiang
作者单位：United States Department of Defense; United States Navy; Naval Postgraduate School; Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We develop a tractable incomplete-markets model with an earnings process Y subject to permanent shocks and borrowing constraints. Financial frictions cause the marginal (certainty equivalent) value of wealth W to be greater than unity and decrease with liquidity w = W/Y. Additionally, financial frictions cause consumption to decrease with this endogenously determined marginal value of liquidity. Risk aversion and the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution play very different roles on consum...
