Approximate implementation in Markovian environments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Renou, Ludovic; Tomala, Tristan
• 署名单位: University of Essex; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.009
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 401-442
• 关键词: Implementation; Undetectability; EFFICIENCY; dynamic; mechanism design; Markov processes

摘要

This paper considers dynamic implementation problems in environments with changing private information (according to Markov processes). A social choice function is approximately implementable if it is correctly implemented an arbitrary large number of times with arbitrary high probability in all (communication) equilibria. We show that if a social choice function is strictly efficient in the set of social choice functions that satisfy an undetectability condition, then it is approximately implementable. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.