Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Reffgen, Alexander
• 署名单位: Lund University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.12.010
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 349-383
• 关键词: Social choice function; strategy-proofness; Single-peakedness; Spatial voting

摘要

We generalize the traditional concept of single-peaked preference domains in two ways. First, we introduce the concept of a multiple single-peaked domain, where the set of alternatives is equipped with several underlying orderings with respect to which a preference can be single-peaked, and we argue that these domains are appropriate to represent preferences over political parties. Second, we define a domain of multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences based on the condition of value-restricted preferences by Sen [34]. We provide complete characterizations of the strategy-proof social choice functions on both multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains. For both domains, we also identify the subclasses consisting of all anonymous strategy-proof social choice functions. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.