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作者：Duggan, John
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：I analyze equilibria of a dynamic political agency model of elections with a two-period term limit in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard. In equilibrium, office holders' policy choices are ordered by type; politicians exert positive effort in the first term of office; and as politicians become highly office motivated, the highest politician type mixes with positive probability between shirking and choosing arbitrarily high policies. Nevertheless, the commitment problem of voter...
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作者：Lu, Shih En
作者单位：Simon Fraser University
摘要：This paper characterizes generic equilibrium play in a multi-sender version of Crawford and Sobel's (1982) cheap talk model, when robustness to a broad class of beliefs about noise in the senders' observation of the state is required. Just like in the one-sender model, information transmission is partial, equilibria have an interval form, and they can be computed through a generalized version of Crawford and Sobel's forward solution procedure. Fixing the senders' biases, full revelation is not...
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作者：Frankel, David M.
作者单位：Iowa State University
摘要：Distressed firms are vulnerable to inefficient panic-based runs of their workers, suppliers, and customers. A policymaker may try to prevent such a run by pledging to protect the interests of these stakeholders should a firm cease to do business. However, this promise also enables the firm to demand better terms of trade from its stakeholders, which blunts the policy's effectiveness. We show how to avoid such an adverse response by the use of partial, countercyclical insurance. Under certain c...
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作者：Heggedal, Tom-Reiel; Moen, Espen R.; Preugschat, Edgar
作者单位：BI Norwegian Business School; Dortmund University of Technology
摘要：This paper proposes an explicit model of spillovers through labor flows in a framework with search frictions. Firms can choose to innovate or to imitate by hiring a worker from a firm that has already innovated. We show that if innovating firms can commit to long-term wage contracts with their workers, productivity spillovers are fully internalized. If firms cannot commit to long-term wage contracts, there is too little innovation and too much imitation in equilibrium. Our model is tractable a...
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作者：Bryan, Kevin A.; Lemus, Jorge
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：How do innovation policies affect the direction of research? Is market-based innovation too radical or too incremental? We construct a novel and tractable model of the direction of innovation. Firms pursue inefficient research directions because they race to discover easy yet less valuable projects and because they work on difficult inventions where they can appropriate a larger portion of the social value. Fixing these inefficiencies requires policy to condition on properties of inventions th...
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作者：Burdett, Kenneth; Trejos, Alberto; Wright, Randall
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; INCAE Business School; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We propose a new search-theoretic model of monetary exchange with indivisible assets, based on price posting instead of bargaining, and incorporating noisy search. This yields some familiar results, plus a lot more. The model admits multiple steady states due to the self-referential nature of liquidity. It admits cyclic, chaotic and stochastic equilibria, and compared to bargaining versions, the dynamics are more general and have better microfoundations. It generates price dispersion, with int...
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作者：Irmen, Andreas; Tabakovic, Amer
作者单位：University of Luxembourg; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Milan
摘要：The determinants of the direction of technical change and their implications for economic growth and economic policy are studied in the one-sector neoclassical growth model of Ramsey, Cass, and Koopmans extended to allow for endogenous capital- and labor-augmenting technical change. We build on a recently developed micro-foundation for the competitive production sector that rests on the idea that the fabrication of output requires tasks to be performed by capital and labor (Irmen, 2017). Firms...
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作者：Lleras, Juan Sebastian; Masatlioglu, Yusufcan; Nakajima, Daisuke; Ozbay, Erkut Y.
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Otaru University of Commerce
摘要：There is well-established evidence that decision makers consistently fail to consider all available options. Instead, they restrict attention to only a subset of alternatives and then undertake a more detailed analysis of this reduced set. This systematic lack of consideration of available options can lead to a more is less effect, where excess of options can be welfare-reducing for a decision-maker (DM). Building on this idea, we model individuals who might pay attention to only a subset of t...
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作者：Laclau, Marie; Tomala, Tristan
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：We consider repeated games with compact actions sets and pure strategies in which players commonly observe a public signal which reveals imperfectly the action profile. We characterize the set of payoffs profiles that can be sustained by a perfect equilibrium, as players become increasingly patient. There are two conditions: admissibility and joint rationality. An admissibly feasible payoff can be achieved by an action profile that offers no unilateral deviation which is both undetectable and ...
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作者：Hirata, Daisuke; Kasuya, Yusuke
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University
摘要：This paper studies stable and (one-sided) strategy-proof rules in many-to-one matching markets with contracts. Not assuming any kind of substitutes condition or the law of aggregate demand, we obtain the following results. First, the number of stable and strategy-proof rules is at most one. Second, the doctor-optimal stable rule, whenever it exists, is the unique candidate for a stable and strategy-proof rule. Third, a stable and strategy-proof rule, whenever it exists, is second-best optimal ...
