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作者：Murto, Pauli; Valimaki, Juuso
作者单位：Aalto University
摘要：This note analyzes different types of all-pay auctions when the number of bidders becomes large. We compute the distributions of the highest bids for the first-price all pay auction and we show that the expected payment made by the winning bidder converges to half of the total payments. In the second-price all-pay auction (the war of attrition), the highest bid amounts to about 35.5% of the total revenues. We also compute the payments for all-pay auctions with multiple prizes. (C) 2017 Elsevie...
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作者：Hayashi, Takashi; Lombardi, Michele
作者单位：University of Glasgow
摘要：Consider a society with a finite number of sectors (social issues or commodities). In a partial equilibrium (PE) mechanism a sector authority (SA) aims to elicit agents' preference rankings for outcomes at hand, presuming separability of preferences, while such presumption is false in general and such isolated rankings might be artifacts. This paper studies what can be Nash implemented if we take such misspecification of PE analysis as a given institutional constraint. The objective is to unco...
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作者：Peck, James
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：This paper demonstrates how equilibrium involving anticipated boycotts and actual boycotts can occur, even though consumers are negligible and only care about the price they pay and the timing of purchase. The model is a two-period durable goods monopoly game with demand uncertainty. First, a non-boycott equilibrium is characterized. Under regularity assumptions ruling out multiplicative uncertainty, there are additional equilibria in which the firm sets a low price in period 0, based on the a...
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作者：Manea, Mihai
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We establish the existence of steady states in two classic matching and bargaining models with general trader asymmetries, search processes, and production functions. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Perea, Andres
作者单位：Maastricht University; Maastricht University
摘要：All equilibrium concepts implicitly make a correct beliefs assumption, stating that a player believes that his opponents are correct about his first-order beliefs. In this paper we show that in many dynamic games of interest, this correct beliefs assumption may be incompatible with a very basic form of forward induction reasoning: the first two layers of extensive-form rationalizability (Pearce, 1984; Battigalli, 1997, epistemically characterized by Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2002). Hence, fo...
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作者：Bikhchandani, Sushil
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：Two notions of stability, ex ante stability and Bayesian stability, are investigated in a matching model with non-transferrable utility, interdependent preferences, and one-sided incomplete information. Ex ante stable matching-outcomes are unblocked for every belief on the blocking partner's type while Bayesian stable matching-outcomes are unblocked with respect to prior beliefs. Ex ante stability is a minimal requirement. Bayesian stability is a more selective desideratum with sound efficienc...
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作者：Casajus, Andre; Yokote, Koji
作者单位：HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management; Waseda University
摘要：The principle of differential marginality for cooperative games states that the differential of two players' payoffs does not change when the differential of these players' marginal contributions to coalitions containing neither of them does not change. Together with two standard properties, efficiency and the null player property, differential marginality characterizes the Shapley value. For games that contain more than two players, we show that this characterization can be improved by using ...
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作者：Erdil, Aytek; Ergin, Haluk
作者单位：University of Cambridge; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Most of the two-sided matching literature maintains the assumption that agents are never indifferent between any two members of the opposite side. In practice, however, ties in preferences arise naturally and are widespread. Market design needs to handle ties carefully, because in the presence of indifferences, stability no longer implies Pareto efficiency, and the deferred acceptance algorithm cannot be applied to produce a Pareto efficient or a worker-optimal stable matching. We allow ties i...
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作者：Balmaceda, Felipe; Escobar, Juan F.
作者单位：Universidad de Chile
摘要：This paper studies which social networks maximize trust and welfare when agreements are implicitly enforced. We study a repeated trust game in which trading opportunities arise exogenously and a social network determines the information each player has. The main contribution of the paper is the characterization of optimal networks under alternative assumptions about how information flows across a network. When a defection is observed only by the victim's connections, cohesive networks are Pare...
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作者：Cerdeiro, Diego A.; Dziubinski, Marcin; Goyal, Sanjeev
作者单位：International Monetary Fund; University of Warsaw; University of Cambridge; University of Cambridge
摘要：Individuals derive benefits from their connections, but these may expose them to external threats. Agents therefore invest in security to protect themselves. What are the network architectures that maximize collective welfare? We propose a model to explore the tension between connectivity and exposure to an external threat when security choices are decentralized. We find that both over-investment and under-investment in security are possible, and that optimal network architectures depend on th...
