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作者：Alonso, Ricardo; Camara, Odilon
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Southern California
摘要：In a world in which rational individuals may hold different prior beliefs, a sender can influence the behavior of a receiver by controlling the informativeness of an experiment (public signal). We characterize the set of distributions of posterior beliefs that can be induced by an experiment, and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a sender to benefit from persuasion. We then provide sufficient conditions for the sender to benefit from persuasion for almost every pair of prior beli...
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作者：Bade, Sophie
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Max Planck Society
摘要：No group-strategyproof and ex-post Pareto optimal random matching mechanism treats equals equally. Every mechanism that arises out of the randomization over a set of non-bossy and strategyproof mechanisms is non-bossy. Random serial dictatorship, which arises out of a randomization over all deterministic serial dictatorships is non-bossy but not group-strategyproof. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Benndorf, Volker; Martinez-Martinez, Ismael; Normann, Hans-Theo
作者单位：Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf
摘要：Standard one- and two-population models for evolutionary games are the limit cases of a uniparametric family combining intra- and intergroup interactions. Our setup interpolates between both extremes with a coupling parameter K. For the example of the hawk dove game, we analyze the replicator dynamics of the coupled model. We confirm the existence of a bifurcation in the dynamics of the system and identify three regions for equilibrium selection, one of which does not appear in common one- and...
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作者：Dizdar, Deniz; Moldovanu, Benny
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; University of Bonn
摘要：The paper provides a possible explanation for the occurrence of uniform, fixed-proportion rules for sharing surplus in two-sided markets. We study a two-sided matching model with transferable utility where agents are characterized by privately known, multi-dimensional attributes that jointly determine the surplus of each potential partnership. We ask the following question: for what divisions of surplus within matched pairs is it possible to implement the efficient (surplus-maximizing) matchin...
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作者：Goeree, Jacob K.; Lindsay, Luke
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney; University of Cologne; University of Exeter
摘要：We employ laboratory methods to study the stability of competitive equilibrium in Scarf's economy (Scarf, 1960). Tatonnement theory predicts that prices are globally unstable for this economy, i.e. unless prices start at the competitive equilibrium they oscillate without converging. Anderson et al. (2004) report that in laboratory double auction markets, prices in the Scarf economy do indeed oscillate with no clear sign of convergence. We replicate their experiments and confirm that tatonnemen...
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作者：Duggan, John
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：Assuming three or more alternatives, there is no systematic rule for aggregating individual preferences that satisfies acyclicity and the standard independence and Pareto axioms, that avoids making some voter a weak dictator, and that is minimally responsive to changes in voter preferences. The latter axiom requires that a preference reversal in the same direction by roughly one third of all voters is sufficient to break social indifference. This result substantially strengthens classical acyc...
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作者：Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
作者单位：Lund University; Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：This paper explores a housing market with an existing tenant in each house and where the existing tenants initially rent their houses. The idea is to identify equilibrium prices for the housing market given the prerequisite that a tenant can buy any house on the housing market, including the one that he is currently possessing, or continue renting the house he is currently occupying. The main contribution is the identification of an individually rational, equilibrium selecting, and group non -...
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作者：Baccara, Mariagiovanna; Yariv, Leeat
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); California Institute of Technology
摘要：This paper studies the formation of peer groups entailing the joint production of public goods. In our model agents choose their peers and have to pay a connection cost for each member added to the group. After groups are formed, each agent selects a public project to make a costly contribution to, and all members of the group experience the benefits of these contributions. Since agents differ in how much they value one project relative to the other, the group's preferences affect the generate...
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作者：Wong, Tsz-Nga
作者单位：Bank of Canada
摘要：This paper applies a mechanism design approach to construct a lower bound to the welfare cost of inflation that does not depend on quasi-linear preferences or details of how agents trade. An incentive-feasible trading protocol is derived to minimize the welfare loss subject to frictions rendering money essential. The welfare cost of inflation under this optimal protocol is the lower bound over all pairwise trading protocols of monetary exchange. In general, the first-best is not implementable,...
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作者：Arieli, Itai; Babichenko, Yakov
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：We consider two-player random extensive form games where the payoffs at the leaves are independently drawn at random from a given feasible set C. We study the asymptotic distribution of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for binary-trees with increasing depth in various random (or deterministic) assignments of players to nodes. We characterize the assignments under which the asymptotic distribution concentrates around a point. Our analysis provides a novel way with a solid strategic justi...
