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作者：Pupato, German
作者单位：Toronto Metropolitan University
摘要：This paper introduces moral hazard into a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms to study wage inequality between homogeneous workers. Optimal performance pay contracts yield non-degenerate wage distributions among co-workers, enabling the analysis of two conceptually distinct and empirically relevant dimensions of wage dispersion: between-firm and within-firm inequality. The latter remains virtually unexplored in the literature. As an application, I characterize analytically the i...
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作者：Nikandrova, Arina; Pancs, Romans
作者单位：Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：We consider a single-item, independent private value auction environment with two bidders: a leader, who knows his valuation, and a follower, who privately chooses how much to learn about his valuation. We show that, under some conditions, an ex-post efficient revenue-maximizing auction which solicits bids sequentially partially discloses the leader's bid to the follower, to influence his learning. The disclosure rule that emerges is novel; it may reveal to the follower only a pair of bids to ...
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作者：Auer, Raphael A.; Saure, Philip
作者单位：Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Swiss National Bank (SNB)
摘要：We develop a model of vertical innovation in which firms incur a market entry cost and choose a unique level of quality. Once established, firms compete for market shares, selling to consumers with heterogeneous tastes for quality. The equilibrium of the pricing game exists and is unique within our setup. Exogenous productivity growth induces firms to enter the market sequentially at the top end of the quality spectrum. A central feature of the model is that optimization problems of consecutiv...
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作者：Hui Ou-Yang; Wu, Weili
作者单位：Central University of Finance & Economics
摘要：In this paper, we correct part (b) of Theorem 6 of Grossman and Stiglitz (GS, 1980). We demonstrate that when the private signal tends to be perfect, the market converges to strong-form efficiency, and thus informed and uninformed traders have almost homogeneous beliefs about the stock payoff, but there is still significant net trade, rather than no trade as erroneously shown by GS. We further show that when the stock price becomes more informative, and thus traders' beliefs about the stock pa...
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作者：Obara, Ichiro; Park, Jaeok
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Yonsei University
摘要：In this paper, we introduce a general class of time discounting, which may exhibit present bias or future bias, to repeated games with perfect monitoring. A strategy profile is called an agent subgame perfect equilibrium if there is no profitable one-shot deviation by any player at any history. We study strongly symmetric agent subgame perfect equilibria for repeated games with a symmetric stage game. We find that the worst punishment equilibrium takes different forms for different types of bi...
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作者：Yang, Yi-You
作者单位：Aletheia University
摘要：The maximal domain theorem by Gul and Stacchetti (1999) shows that for markets with indivisible objects, the set of gross substitutable preferences is a largest set for which the existence of a competitive equilibrium is guaranteed. In this paper, we give an example to show that a claim in their proof is false, and provide an alternative proof based on a new characterization of gross substitutability. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Nezafat, Mahdi; Schroder, Mark; Wang, Qinghai
作者单位：Michigan State University; Michigan State University's Broad College of Business; State University System of Florida; University of Central Florida
摘要：During financial crises, financial market regulators often restrict short-selling to support prices and curb volatility. However, evidence suggests that short-selling bans during the turmoil in financial markets in 2007-2009 failed to achieve regulators' goals. We analyze a model of costly private information acquisition and asset pricing under short-sale constraints to examine a possible cause of this failure. We show that the constraints increase return volatility by adversely affecting the ...
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作者：Pejsachowicz, Leonardo; Toussaert, Severine
作者单位：Princeton University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：In a standard model of menu choice, we examine the behavior of an agent who applies the following Cautious Deferral rule: Whenever in doubt, don't commit; just leave options open. Our primitive is a complete preference relation that represents the agent's choice behavior. The agent's indecisiveness is captured by means of a possibly incomplete (but otherwise rational) preference relation >=. We ask when can be viewed as a Cautious Deferral completion of some incomplete Under the independence a...
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作者：Bajaj, Ayushi; Hu, Tai-Wei; Rocheteau, Guillaume; Silva, Mario Rafael
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; Northwestern University
摘要：This paper offers two ways to decentralize the constrained-efficient allocation of the Lagos - Wright (2005) pure currency economy. The first way has divisible money, take-it-or-leave-it offers by buyers, and a transfer scheme financed by money creation. If agents are sufficiently patient, the first best is achieved for finite money growth rates. if agents are impatient, the equilibrium allocation approaches the constrained efficient allocation asymptotically as the money growth rate tends to ...
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作者：Fong, Yuk-fai; Li, Jin
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Northwestern University
摘要：This paper studies a relational contracting model in which the agent is protected by a limited liability constraint. The agent's effort is his private information and affects output stochastically. We characterize the optimal relational contract and compare the dynamics of the relationship with that under the optimal long-term contract. Under the optimal relational contract, the relationship is less likely to survive, and the surviving relationship is less efficient. In addition, relationships...
